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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
summary proceeding to enforce his rights in a situation where he has
unreasonably permitted large sums of rental arrears to accrue. 93 More-
over, where a tenant can show bad faith on the part of the landlord, as
in the case where he attempts to circumvent eviction procedures and
use the nonpayment to evict a tenant from a rent-controlled apartment,
or where some other basis for equitable estoppel is present, the Antil-
lean decision suggests that the landlord will be denied recovery in the
summary proceeding. In instances where the landlord's delay in bring-
ing the summary proceeding is unavoidable, however, Judge Kassal
indicates that the three-month rule need not be applied.194
In view of the history of landlord-tenant controversies and the
confusion surrounding the adoption of the three-month rule, the in-
terpretation given by Judge Kassal seems most equitable. Arbitrary and
inflexible rules too often result in injustice. In light of the likelihood of
abuse in cases where the landlord has delayed commencing the sum-
mary proceeding, the burden of proving reasonable diligence is prop-
erly placed upon him. On the other hand, the primary purpose of the
three-month rule is to preserve the integrity of the summary proceeding,
and, therefore, the rule should not be interpreted to automatically
inure to the benefit of the tenant and thus bar the landlord from re-
covery.
DOLE v. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Actions Against a Village
CPLR 9801195 bars any action in negligence against a village unless
it is served with a notice of claim pursuant to section 50-e of the Gen-
193 The language employed by the court in Maxwell, in establishing the three-month
rule, suggests that the three-month period governing the commencement of summary
nonpayment proceedings is similar to a statute of limitations. Thus, when a landlord
attempts to recover more than three months rent in a single proceeding, it will be deemed
to be for rent which accrued during the three-month period immediately preceding the
commencement of the action. Consequently, he will be barred from collecting an amount
in excess of three months rent. Yet, when faced with the problem, the courts have followed
one of three procedures, all in the name of the three-month rule. They have either (1)
dismissed the proceeding altogether with leave to commence an action at law (Gramford
and Romero); (2) dismissed the proceeding without prejudice to the commencement of a
summary proceeding solely for three months rent or a plenary action at law for all rent
due (Stokes); or (3) having excused the delay, permitted recovery for more than three
months rent (Malek and United Artists).
194 See note 186 supra.
195 CPLR 9801 provides:
1. No action shall be maintained against the village for a personal injury or
injury to property alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence or
wrongful act of the village or of any officer, agent or employee thereof, unless
a notice of claim shall have been made and served in compliance with section
fifty-e of the general municipal law.
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eral Municipal Law.196 Compliance with the ninety-day notice provision
of the General Municipal Law is a condition precedent to the com-
mencement of any tort action against a municipality.197 Notwithstand-
ing service of a timely notice of claim, in certain instances a plaintiff
may never have an opportunity to litigate unless the municipality had
been served with a notice of defect within a reasonable time prior to
the accident. 98 Accordingly, section 6-628 of the Village Law imposes
this additional condition precedent to the maintenance of any action
for damages sustained as the result of a defective, snow-covered, or icy
road, street, sidewalk, or bridge.199
The failure of an original plaintiff to furnish the required notice
of claim, although fatal to the main action against the municipality,
will not defeat a third-party claim by a co-tortfeasor against the same
governmental unit.200 Compliance with section 50-e of the General
2. Every such action shall be commenced pursuant to the provisions of section
fifty-i of the general municipal law.
196 N.Y. GEN. MuNIc. ILAw § 50-e (McKinney 1965) reads in pertinent part:
1. In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as
a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special proceeding
against a public corporation .... the notice shall comply with the provisions of
this section and it shall be given within ninety days after the claim arises.
2. The notice shall be in writing, sworn to by or on behalf of the claimant,
and shall set forth: (1) the name and post-office address of each claimant, and of
his attorney, if any; (2) the nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the place
where and the manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the items of damage or
injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable.
197 8 WK&M 9801.02; H. WAcHIELL, NEw YoRK PRACricE UNDER Tm CPLR 70
(4th ed. 1973). The General Municipal Law also prescribes an abbreviated statute of
limitations. Section 50-i provides that an action against a municipality in negligence
"shall be commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event
upon which the claim is based." N.Y. GEN. MUitc. LAw § 50-i (McKinney 1965).
198 See, e.g., N.Y. VILLAGn LAW § 6-628 (McKinney 1973). This statute has been adopted
into the CPLR as section 9804.
199 CPLR 9804 provides:
No civil action shall be maintained against the village for damages or injuries
to person or property sustained in consequence of any street, highway, bridge,
culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk being defective, out of repair, unsafe, dangerous
or obstructed or for damages or injuries to persons or property sustained solely
in consequence of the existence of snow or ice upon any sidewalk, crosswalk,
street, highway, bridge or culvert unless written notice of the defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructive condition, or of the existence of the snow or ice, relating
to the particular place, was actually given to the village clerk and there was a
failure or neglect within a reasonable time after the receipt of such notice to
repair or remove the defect, danger or obstruction complained of or to cause
the snow or ice to be removed, or the place otherwise made reasonably safe.
200 In Valstrey Serv. Corp. v. Board of Elections, 2 N.Y.2d 413, 141 N.E.2d 565, 161
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1957) (per curiam), the plaintiff in the principal action was injured upon
stepping into a hole while entering an election booth. The defendant commenced a third-
party action against the county for damages it might be obligated to pay the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals concluded that under the circumstances, no notice of claim was
required to be served upon the county as a condition precedent to the maintenance of
the third-party indemnification action.
In Accredited Demolition Constr. Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 37 App. Div. 2d 708, 324
N.Y.S.2d 377 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.), the Second Department relied upon the holding in
1974]
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Municipal Law is not a condition precedent to maintenance of the
indemnification action. This distinction from the general rule arises
since any claim which the third-party plaintiff may have against the
governmental body is not asserted until the third-party plaintiff is made
a defendant in the main action, a time, most often, long after the
ninety-day period has expired.201
In Barry v. Niagara Transit System, Inc., 20 2 the Supreme Court,
Erie County, was confronted with the issue of whether the failure of a
village to receive prior notice of defect, concededly barring suit by the
original plaintiff,203 would similarly bar a subsequent Dole indemnifica-
tion claim against that village. In Barry, plaintiff, injured while exiting
from a bus operated by Niagara, commenced an action against the com-
pany for negligent operation of the bus and for failure to provide a safe
place to alight. The Village of Kenmore was made a co-defendant for
its alleged failure to keep a street curb in repair and for failing to warn
plaintiff of the unsafe condition. Since the required notice of defect
had not been given, the action as to the village was subsequently dis-
missed. Nonetheless, Niagara then brought a third-party claim against
the village for a Dole apportionment of any judgment recovered by the
plaintiff against it. In dismissing Niagara's claim, the court refused to
waive the notice of defect requirement and thereby "permit indirectly
what could not be done by the plaintiffs themselves" 2°4 in the principal
action.
The court's holding finds support in the theoretical underpin-
nings of both notice statutes. The notice of claim requirement seeks,
as its primary function, "to assure the [municipality] an adequate op-
portunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and
to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily
available." 20 5 Designed solely for the benefit of the municipality, notice
of claim may be waived without offending legal theory or public
Valstrey and permitted an action for indemnification to be maintained against the City of
Yonkers even though a notice of claim had not been filed. See also Fontana v. Town of
Hempstead, 18 App. Div. 2d 1084, 239 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.); Zillman v.
Meadowbrook Hospital, 73 Misc. 2d 726, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973);
48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 199, n.204 (1972). For a discussion of the Zillman case by Professor
David D. Siegel, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 239 (1974).
201 Shapiro, Dole v. Dow and Problems It Created, 171 N.Y.L.J. 28, Feb. 8, 1974, at 5,
col. 2-3.
202 76 Misc. 2d 316, 351 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1972), aff'd mem., 42 App.
Div. 2d 1035, 348 N.Y.S.2d 974 (4th Dep't 1973).
203 See Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362, 222 N.E.2d
376, 275 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1966); McCord v. Village of Walden, 38 App. Div. 2d 741, 349
N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.); Spina v. Switzer Contracting Co., 32 Misc. 2d 94, 221
N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
204 76 Misc. 2d at 318, 351 N.YS.2d at 252.
205Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952).
[Vol. 49:170
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policy. 20° By contrast, the notice of defect is an essential ingredient in
establishing negligence on the part of the municipality. 207 Since the vil-
lage may be deemed culpable only after the notice of defect has been
received and a reasonable time to repair has elapsed, where no notice is
given, it cannot become a tortfeasor. 20 8 As such, the rule of Dole,
permitting an apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors, can-
not apply.
The Supreme Court, Erie County, has struck the chord which
distinguishes the notice of claim and the notice of defect. While both
are conditions precedent, the latter is a key element in defining action-
able negligence. Consequently, no liability may rest on the village, be it
through a Dole apportionment or otherwise, absent compliance with
the notice of defect requirements.
Collection of Judgments
CPLR 1007 basically provides for the right to indemnification by
way of impleader.211 In Adams v. Lindsay,210 the Supreme Court, Mon-
206 N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 50-e (McKinney 1965) allows for an extension of time
where unyielding insistence on compliance with the ninety-day period would work hard-
ship. The statute provides, in relevant part:
5. The court, in its discretion, may grant leave to serve a notice of claim within
a reasonable time after the expiration of the time specified in subdivision one
of this section in the following cases: (1) Where the claimant is an infant, or is
mentally or physically incapacitated, and by reason of such disability fails to serve
a notice of claim within the time specified; (2) where a person entitled to make a
claim dies before the expiration of the time limited for service of the notice;
or (3) where the claimant fails to serve a notice of claim within the time limited
for service of the notice by reason of his justifiable reliance upon settlement
representations made in writing by an authorized representative of the party
against which the claim is made or of its insurance carrier.
Furthermore, compliance with the notice of claim requirements of § 50-e are unnecessary
in actions brought in equity. Fontana v. Town of Hempstead, 18 App. Div. 2d 1084, 239
N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.). Additionally, courts have been willing to find
a waiver of this condition where a municipality, through its own intransigence, has in-
duced a plaintiff to rely on the sufficiency of an improperly drafted notice of claim until
the ninety-day period has expired. Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108
N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952). See also Chikara v. City of New York, 21 Misc. 2d 446, 190
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 App. Div. 2d 862,
199 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1960) (mem.).
See generally Note, Notice of Claim in Negligence Actions, 22 BKLYN. L. Rnv. 342
(1956); Note, Late Filing of Claim Against City Where Claimant is Incapacitated, 7
SYRAcsE L. REv. 337 (1956); Note, Renewed Recommendations for Revision of Section
50-e of General Municipal Law, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 318 (1950).
20776 Misc. 2d at 319, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
208 See King v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 35 Misc. 2d 75, 229 N.Y.S.2d 840
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
209 713 McKiNEY's CPLR 1007, commentary at 333 (1963); see WK&M 1007.01. The
practice of impleader furnishes the means for a determination of primary and ultimate
responsibility in one proceeding, thus avoiding a multiplicity of actions. H. WACEL,
Nav YoRK PCrICnE UNDER un CPLR 94 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WACHT=L].
For a discussion of the development of indemnity in New York, see Note, Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 185, 189-200 (1972).
21077 Misc. 2d 824, 354 N.YS.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974). For a concise
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